terça-feira, 17 de novembro de 2026



AUTONEWS




Why even mercedes cannot afford to manufacture in Germany?

The German automotive industry is not merely the engine of Europe’s largest economy. For years, it served as a symbol of manufacturing quality and a means to fiercely defend thousands of jobs. Yet, the “Made in Germany” label—once a source of pride for European automakers—no longer carries the same weight. After the Volkswagen Group, the world’s second-largest automotive conglomerate, shook the foundations of the German economy by announcing plans to cut 100,000 jobs globally and close four domestic plants, the seismic shock reached the very brand that invented the automobile. Even Mercedes can no longer afford the luxury of manufacturing its vehicles in Germany.

An internal memo to employees, obtained by Reuters, contains two “devastating” statements. Michael Schiebe, head of production for the brand—who has spent months pressuring the workforce to curb costs—announced that management has decided to halt all further investment in its German facilities. Meanwhile, Mercedes board member Britta Seeger opened the door to the unthinkable, stating in the same communication that while the company had always sought to avoid closing plants in Germany at all costs, “unfortunately, we must now examine this option in greater detail.”

This new strategy from Mercedes follows the collapse of negotiations with the workforce aimed at reaching an agreement to reduce labor costs—a significant portion of operational expenses that, amid intensifying competition from China, is weighing heavily on automakers' profit margins. Even so-called premium brands are not immune to this pressure.

The closure of automotive plants on German soil marks an unprecedented turning point. And there is a simple explanation for these cuts: it is far cheaper to manufacture outside of Germany than within it. Even German automakers do not seem inclined to sacrifice profits to preserve jobs in their home country. In fact, the consulting firm Roland Berger estimates that as many as 200,000 jobs in the German automotive sector could vanish by 2030.
To get an idea of ​​what lies ahead, consider the figures presented last September by the German newspaper *Bild*, which compared production costs in Germany with those in Portugal or China—data derived from a study conducted by Volkswagen itself. The conclusion: manufacturing a car in a German plant costs more than twice as much as in a Portuguese facility (Autoeuropa) and more than four times as much as in a Chinese factory. German workers earn higher wages, work fewer hours, and have lower output. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that local manufacturers are increasingly viewing the relocation of production as an attractive option.

The Mercedes board has jointly decided to stop all further investment in German sites, Michael Schiebe says in the interview of 12 November 2026. His reasoning is that many rounds of talks have produced no outline of a solution, and that Mercedes cannot invest in Germany at today's cost structures. No sum and no end date have been made public. Schiebe points to tariffs, price pressure, weaker demand and competition from China. The adjusted return on sales at Mercedes-Benz Cars fell to 2.5 percent in the third quarter, from 4.8 percent a year earlier, and the full-year target was cut to between 2 and 3 percent.
Britta Seeger, the board member for human resources, says Mercedes must now examine in detail which German sites it can still afford. "We all want to avoid plant closures at any price," she says, but the option now has to be pursued more concretely, and without an agreement "we will take very hard steps". The threat dates from 21 September, when Schiebe told a works meeting in Sindelfingen that one German assembly plant and one powertrain plant would close if costs did not fall. Mercedes assembles cars in Sindelfingen, Rastatt and Bremen. Its powertrain sites include Untertürkheim, Affalterbach, Berlin, Hamburg, Kamenz, Kölleda and Arnstadt. No site has been named.

A production hour in Germany costs up to five times as much as one at sites in Eastern Europe, Schiebe says, with a similar gap in administration. Chief executive Ola Källenius gave a fuller scale at a Süddeutsche Zeitung event in Berlin, in remarks reported on 11 November: if Germany is 100, Hungary is 30, Romania 20, China between 10 and 20 and the United States 80. Five times is the Romanian end of that scale. Hungary, where Mercedes builds the electric C-Class at Kecskemét and has doubled the plant to 400,000 cars a year, comes out at just over three times. Eurostat's 2025 manufacturing figures agree: €49.50 an hour in Germany, €15.60 in Hungary.

Källenius sets the target at 80, the level he gives the United States, which means cutting German labour costs by a fifth: "from 100 to 80 is possible", he said. The board's main lever is a 40-hour week in place of 35 for the same pay. That lowers the cost of an hour by 12.5 percent, so the longer week alone delivers under two thirds of the target, and management also wants to reach special payments, profit sharing and the holiday and Christmas bonuses. The works council and IG Metall call the 35-hour week a red line. Tesla, by comparison, runs Grünheide on a 38-hour week and uses the same words about going down to 35.

IG Metall has proposed letting companies deviate temporarily from collective agreement standards in return for binding investment commitments. The offer, made in the current pay round for the metal and electrical industry, ties those exceptions to future products, sites, jobs and training. Källenius said in Berlin that he was open to it, and that investment commitments for Germany could be discussed with Mercedes. The freeze now withholds what that proposal trades. The other limit is contractual: a package agreed with the group works council on 4 March 2025 rules out compulsory redundancies in Germany until the end of 2034, for about 91,000 employees. Porsche's package with its unions follows the same pattern, cutting 9,000 jobs while protecting core staff until 2035.

as open to IG Metall's offer, the freeze sets the price of that trade before it is negotiated. Closure is no cheap exit: with the guarantee to 2034, a closed plant still has a workforce to pay or buy out. The 40-hour week on its own covers 12.5 of the 20 points Källenius wants, so the board needs the union for the rest.

A site agreement will arrive before any closure does. Mercedes published its 2025 results on 12 February 2026. By the same point in 2027 the freeze will have been lifted for at least one named German plant, in exchange for longer hours that stop short of 40, and no assembly plant will have been named for closure. A chief executive who names 80 as the target has already told the works council where the deal is.

“Energiewende”... For decades, BASF was not only Germany’s largest chemical company but, at times, the largest chemical group in the world. Beginning in 2022—and especially throughout 2023 and 2024—the company announced large-scale cost-cutting programs and job losses in Germany, while simultaneously investing billions in new facilities in China. BASF justified this decision by pointing to high energy prices in Germany and Europe’s declining competitiveness. In February 2024, BASF stated that it would need to save an additional billion euros annually by the end of 2026 at its Ludwigshafen site alone; high energy costs, weak demand, and excessive production costs in Germany were explicitly cited as reasons. Meanwhile, BASF is investing up to ten billion euros in a new integrated production complex in Zhanjiang, China. Today, many view the case of BASF as a symbol of how high energy costs and mounting bureaucracy are weakening Germany as a hub for industrial production, prompting major companies to shift their growth and investments to Asia.

Germany’s economic output has stagnated for seven years, a trend driven in part by a massive surge in energy prices. In his book *Absturz. So retten wir Deutschland* (“Free Fall: How We Can Save Germany”), economist Daniel Stelter notes that, according to a survey, 63% of industrial firms believe their competitiveness is at risk. Among energy-intensive industrial companies, this figure is even higher. Furthermore, two-thirds of large, energy-intensive enterprises with more than 500 employees are already planning to relocate their operations elsewhere. Russia’s war against Ukraine plays a role, but the crisis began long before that, triggered by the so-called “Energiewende” (energy transition)—an initiative that started during Angela Merkel’s administration and was pushed forward by Robert Habeck, who, at the time, served as Minister for Economic Affairs representing the Green Party. In essence, this involves transforming Germany’s energy sector, shifting it from a market economy toward a planned economy steered by a political ideology.

“Germany’s Energiewende is being implemented without any regard for the costs,” writes economist Stelter. When asked about this at the time, the Ministry for Economic Affairs—then headed by Robert Habeck—stated that it was neither sensible nor necessary to quantify the costs of the Energiewende at that stage.

Stelter estimates that approximately 500 billion euros have already been spent on the “Energiewende.” Calculations suggest that, once the transformation is complete, the total cost will reach between 4.8 and 5.4 trillion euros. “I’ll venture a prediction,” writes Stelter, “that this transformation will not come to pass—for the simple reason that the German economy will not survive it.”

When critics point out that Germany is responsible for only 1.6% of global CO₂ emissions (compared to 30% for China!), proponents of the Energiewende invariably respond that Germany serves as a model and that other countries will follow its lead. In an interview, Katharina Dröge, leader of the Green Party’s parliamentary group in the Bundestag, described Germany’s energy policy as an international success story. “Our Energiewende here in Germany is being copied all over the world,” Dröge claimed.

This assertion is absurd. Stelter counters: “With our *Energiewende* [energy transition], we are not a model for the world. Politicians should finally admit that they have led us down the wrong path over the last 25 years and must initiate a fundamental change in direction.”
Yet, this is not happening under the Merz administration either. The government is staying the course with the *Energiewende*. The disagreement between the CDU, on one hand, and the Greens, on the other, boils down to whether this path should be followed a bit more slowly—as the CDU would like—or even more rapidly, as the Greens prefer.

Mercedes-Benz is not completely leaving Germany—it still builds its flagship models (like the S-Class and E-Class) and core powertrains there—but it has shifted significant production capacity to countries like Hungary, China, the US, and Mexico.

Making mass-market or high-volume vehicles in Germany has become increasingly uncompetitive due to a combination of structural costs:

  • Highest Labor Costs in the Automotive World: German auto workers are among the highest-paid globally, factoring in high wages, strong union protections (IG Metall), generous pensions, and strict limits on working hours. Total labor costs per hour in Germany are roughly double or triple those in neighboring Eastern European countries like Hungary or Poland.

  • Surging Energy Prices: Following the loss of cheap Russian pipeline gas and the phase-out of nuclear power, industrial electricity prices in Germany became some of the highest in Europe. Auto manufacturing—especially aluminum smelting, stamping, and paint shops—is heavily energy-intensive.

  • Heavy Regulation and Bureaucracy: Strict environmental regulations, complex permitting processes, and high corporate taxes add overhead and slow down the construction or retrofitting of factories for electric vehicles (EVs).

  • The EV Margin Squeeze: Electric vehicles have fewer moving parts, meaning traditional German mechanical engineering offers less of a competitive moat, while battery costs remain high. To protect profit margins on entry-level and mid-size EVs (like the CLA or EQB), Mercedes has moved production to lower-cost hubs like Kecskemét, Hungary, or closer to key end-markets in the US and China to avoid tariffs and currency fluctuations.

Germany remains viable for Mercedes' high-margin, low-volume luxury and performance vehicles (such as AMG models and the S-Class), where buyers absorb the higher production costs, as well as for core R&D and engineering. However, for high-volume vehicles, the math increasingly favors manufacturing abroad.

Mercedes-Benz is halting new investments in Germany and weighing plant closures because high domestic labor and administrative costs, weak demand, and fierce competition from Chinese automakers have squeezed its profit margins.

Key drivers of the cost squeeze:

• High Labor and Administrative Costs: Hourly production labor costs in Germany can be up to five times higher than at Mercedes plants in Eastern Europe, where administrative costs are also far lower.
• Shrinking Margins and Earnings: Mercedes-Benz cut its full-year 2026 passenger car adjusted return on sales target to between 2% and 3% (down from 4.8% in Q3 2025 to 2.5% in Q3 2026), while aiming to save €800 million.
• Slumping Sales in China: Mercedes-Benz passenger car sales in China fell 31% year-on-year in Q3 2026 (to 86,800 units) and 29% over the first nine months of 2026 as domestic rivals gained ground with competitive pricing, software, and features.
• Tariffs and EV Transition Pressures: Management has pointed to tariffs, price pressure, weaker global demand, and the costly shift toward electric vehicles as compounding headwinds.

Standoff and shift toward Eastern Europe:

• Labor Negotiations: Mercedes-Benz has pushed to raise the standard German workweek from 35 hours to at least 38 hours without extra pay and potentially trim holiday bonuses, but talks with the works council and union have stalled.
• Geographic Shift: With roughly 108,000 employees in Germany (about two-thirds of its global workforce), management is evaluating which domestic sites remain financially viable, while its plant in Kecskemét, Hungary, became its largest factory in 2026


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